Eavesdropping Under New York and Federal Law: How New York is Departing from Long-Standing Interpretations Mirroring Federal Law - People V. Rabb by Ince, Bailey
Touro Law Review 
Volume 28 




Eavesdropping Under New York and Federal Law: How New York 
is Departing from Long-Standing Interpretations Mirroring Federal 
Law - People V. Rabb 
Bailey Ince 
Touro Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, 
Evidence Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ince, Bailey (2012) "Eavesdropping Under New York and Federal Law: How New York is Departing from 
Long-Standing Interpretations Mirroring Federal Law - People V. Rabb," Touro Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 3 , 
Article 25. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/25 
This Fourth Amendment and Automobiles is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro 
Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Eavesdropping Under New York and Federal Law: How New York is Departing 
from Long-Standing Interpretations Mirroring Federal Law - People V. Rabb 
Cover Page Footnote 
28-3 





EAVESDROPPING UNDER NEW YORK AND FEDERAL LAW: 
HOW NEW YORK IS DEPARTING FROM LONG-STANDING 
INTERPRETATIONS MIRRORING FEDERAL LAW 
 
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 
People v. Rabb1 
(decided February 15, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Reginald Rabb was indicted by a grand jury for 
second-degree grand larceny and enterprise corruption for using 
coercive techniques against construction companies.2  The Supreme 
Court denied defendant‟s motion to suppress, to which Rabb pled 
guilty to the previously-mentioned offenses, in addition to others.3  
Defendant was then sentenced to a term of eight-and-a-half to seven-
teen years‟ imprisonment.4  Rabb‟s accomplice, Steven Mason, also 
pled guilty to most of the crimes committed by Rabb after the Su-
preme Court denied his motion to suppress, too.5  Mason was sen-
tenced to a prison term of seven-and-a-half to fifteen years.6 
Both defendants appealed the judgment, alleging that the ea-
vesdropping warrant application failed to meet the requirements ne-
cessary for permitting the use of electronic surveillance, and thus vi-
olated their Fourth Amendment rights.7  Specifically, defendants 
 
1 945 N.E.2d 447 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450. 
3 Id.  Apart from the enterprise corruption and grand larceny charges, Rabb also pled 
guilty to attempted grand larceny and criminal possession of a weapon.  Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  Mason pled guilty to all the same crimes as Rabb did except for the criminal posses-
sion of a weapon charge.  Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 448.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
1
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alleged that the People “failed to establish that normal investigative 
measures had been exhausted, were reasonably unlikely to succeed if 
tried, or were too dangerous to employ,” thereby violating New York 
Criminal Procedure Law section 700.15.8  Pursuant to CPL 700.15, 
investigators may not utilize electronic eavesdropping as an initial 
first step, which is what Rabb and Mason believed they did.9 
After review, the judgments were affirmed by the Appellate 
Division which held that the warrant applications complied with New 
York law and therefore the warrant was valid.10  On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals found supporting evidence for this conclusion and af-
firmed the judgments against Rabb and Mason.11  The purpose of this 
article is to analyze whether the Court of Appeals should have bor-
rowed from CPL 700‟s federal counterpart when following electronic 
eavesdropping procedures.   
II. THE OPINION–PEOPLE V. RABB 
In 2002, the Labor Racketeering Unit of the New York Dis-
trict Attorney‟s Office (“LRU”) commenced an investigation into 
suspected racketeering of Akbar‟s Community Services (“AKS”), a 
minority labor coalition.12  Derrick Walker and his associate, Frede-
rick Rasberry, headed AKS and used the coalition to “force construc-
tion companies, under the threat of vandalism or intimidation, to hire 
coalition workers and/or pay money for „security‟ from intimidation 
from other labor coalitions.”13  To aid their investigation, the LRU 
planted an undercover investigator to pose as a construction company 
owner.14 
Defendants Rabb and Mason were implicated in the criminal 
activities of Walker and Rasberry when, in May 2004, the undercover 
 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
8 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 448. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 448-49. 
11 Id. at 453. 
12 Id. at 449. 
13 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 449. 
14 Id. 
2
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officer conducted an interview with another construction company 
owner.15  The interviewee claimed not to have been contacted by ei-
ther Walker or Rasberry, but rather by an agent for a company called 
P & D.16  After obtaining telephone records, LRU discovered that this 
agent had placed over seventy calls to Walker and Rasberry over a 
six month period.17  Moreover, investigators soon learned that the 
phone number on the agent‟s business card was registered to defen-
dant Rabb.18 
Around February 2005, an agent from another construction 
company approached LRU and claimed to have been confronted by a 
representative from P & D demanding that her company use laborers 
from the community on all of her job sites.19  The business card the 
agent handed to her had the same phone number on it as the business 
card handed to the other contractor.20 
After this incident, LRU applied for and was granted an eave-
sdropping warrant against Rabb in March of 2005.21  The purpose of 
the surveillance, set forth in the warrant, was to “determine the full 
scope of Rabb‟s leadership position in P & D and gather sufficient 
evidence to prosecute the participants in that illegal conduct.”22  In 
November, LRU secured an eavesdropping warrant against Mason, 
setting forth the same goals.23  LRU used the information gathered 
from these warrants to aid its prosecution, and both Mason and Rabb 
pled guilty to, most significantly, enterprise corruption.24 
Under New York law, an eavesdropping warrant may be is-
sued only “[u]pon a showing that normal investigative procedures 
have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous to employ.”25  Additionally, 
“[a] full and complete statement of facts” confirming the existence of 









22 Id. at 449-50. 
23 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450. 
24 Id. 
25 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15(4) (McKinney 2011). 
3
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tion for an eavesdropping warrant.26 
On appeal, both defendants challenged the judgments against 
them, asserting that investigators improperly used eavesdropping as 
an initial first step in the investigation against them and that these in-
vestigators did not provide a particularized showing that traditional 
investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.27  Additionally, 
Rabb alleges that the People failed to satisfy the particularity re-
quirements in that they relied on their investigatory experiences with 
Walker and Rasberry rather than what actually happened during their 
investigation into Rabb.28  Furthermore, defendants argued that the 
use and success of other surveillance techniques, such as “undercover 
operations, witness interviews and search warrants in the Walk-
er/Rasberry investigation,” proves that normal investigative tech-
niques would have provided the same success to their investigation, 
which would have invalidated the People‟s argument that such pro-
cedures were unlikely to succeed.29 
The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals disagreed with 
defendants and affirmed the judgments against them.30  The Court of 
Appeals found that the People had sufficiently satisfied the require-
ments under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law sections 700.15(4) and 
700.20(2)(d).31  According to the court‟s analysis, wiretapping was 
not the initial step in LRU‟s investigation of P & D: the application 
referenced the May 2004 meeting between the P & D agent and 
another construction contractor; the application acknowledged the 
registration of the phone number back to defendant Rabb and P & D; 
Rasberry implicated P & D in an interview with an LRU undercover 
agent; and evidence of continuous telephone communications be-
tween Rabb‟s phone number and Walker, Rasberry, companies with 
known ties to organized crime, and companies that had previous en-
counters with Akbar.32 
 
26 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20(2)(d) (McKinney 2011). 
27 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451. 
28 Id. at 451.  Defendants do not, however, challenge the trial court‟s determination that 
the eavesdropping warrants were issued based upon probable cause.  Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 700.15(2), (3), (5). 
29 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 451-52.  As a result of the eavesdropping performed on Walker, the investigation 
turned up dozens of phone calls that took place between Walker and Rabb.  Id. at 452.  
4
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Furthermore, the court found that the attempts to identify 
Rabb through other surveillance techniques proved unsuccessful.33  In 
addition, the court noted how there was evidence in the record to 
support the lower court‟s finding that “normal investigative proce-
dures were unlikely to succeed.”34  For example: 
[T]he LRU investigator explained that physical sur-
veillance was of limited use because, although it might 
show subjects meeting with each other, it would rarely 
allow LRU to hear the conversations, and that any at-
tempts by LRU investigators to get closer to the sub-
jects to hear the conversations would render it more 
likely that the subjects would discover they were un-
der investigation.35 
The application also pointed out how various avenues of evidence-
gathering would also prove ineffective.36  Search warrants would 
have an equal effect, creating a prospect that the confidentiality of the 
investigation would be compromised, leading to the destruction of in-
culpatory records.37  Lastly, undercover operations with Akbar ex-
posed their limitations, leading LRU to believe an investigation into 
P & D, a similar organization with similar activities, would be just as 
restrictive.38 
The People drew on their “experiences from the Walk-
er/Rasberry investigation” to demonstrate why “normal investigative 
techniques would be ineffective as to Rabb” and P & D.39  Defen-
dants contended that the use of general allegations against minority 
 
These phone conversations detailed collusive efforts between Akbar and P & D and also 
tipped off investigators where meetings between Walker and Rabb would take place.  Rabb, 
945 N.E.2d at 452.  All efforts to observe these meeting, however, proved unsuccessful in 
identifying Rabb.  Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 452-53. 
36 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 453.  Issuing grand jury subpoenas would publicize the investiga-
tion to the custodians of business records, a grand jury investigation would be futile because 
the “witnesses were participants in the criminal conduct, and victims of that conduct would 
be unlikely to testify out of fear of retaliation.”  Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  LRU‟s undercover operations consisted mainly of paying Rasberry and Walker 
$800 per month.  Id.  LRU came to the conclusion that a similar undercover investigation 
into P & G would be no more likely to succeed than the one against Akbar.  Id. 
39 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 453. 
5
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labor coalitions failed to satisfy the requirement of particularity for 
eavesdropping warrants, but the court pointed to the intercepted 
phone calls, collusive efforts to conduct criminal activities, and the 
similarities of the two organizations‟ objectives to reject their conten-
tions.40 
In short, the Court of Appeals ruled that although eavesdrop-
ping is prohibited as a routine initial step in surveillance, law en-
forcement officials are not required to resort to futile techniques.41  In 
other words, it is unnecessary for law enforcement to exhaust all con-
ceivable techniques that will clearly be unproductive before resorting 
to electronic surveillance.42  It is sufficient for an affidavit to describe 
how standard techniques have been tried or would be ineffective in 
order to satisfy CPL 700.15 and 700.20, as was the case here.43 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE NEW 
YORK LEGISLATURE 
Intercepting conversations via electronic devices is considered 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.44  In 1968, Congress enacted 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Title 
III”) to provide guidance when wiretap evidence is at issue.45  Title 
III was a response to the United State Supreme Court‟s ruling in  
Berger v. New York,46 where the Court held that eavesdropping war-
rants must state with particularity the premises to be searched and the 
persons to be seized.47  Title III satisfies the Court‟s requirements by 
“incorporat[ing] the Fourth Amendment‟s protections by placing 
probable cause and particularity conditions on the issuance of a wire-




42 Id. (citing United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
43 Id. (citing United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 310 (2d Cir. 1983). 
44 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (holding that the interception of a 
conversation via an electronic device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment); see also U.S. CONST amend. IV, supra note 7. 
45 United States v. Serrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
46 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
47 Id. at 55. 
48 Serrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (quoting United States v. Segura, No. 3:99CR85(EBB), 
2001 WL 286850, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2001)). 
6
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quirements under Title III satisfies the Fourth Amendment.49 
In Berger, the constitutionality of New York‟s then-current 
eavesdropping statute was called into question.50  Section 813-a of 
New York‟s Code of Criminal Procedure authorized the use of eave-
sdropping upon “oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the 
attorney general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any po-
lice department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof   . . 
. .”51  This oath had to establish a “reasonable ground to believe that 
evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly de-
scribe[ing] the person or persons whose communications, conversa-
tions or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose 
thereof . . . .”52 
While this statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment by requir-
ing a neutral and independent authority to issue the order,53 the broad 
application and scope of the statute is what immediately captured the 
attention of the Supreme Court.54  The Court noted that there was a 
probable cause problem with the statute‟s language, which allowed a 
warrant to be issued upon a showing that “there [are] reasonable 
ground[s] to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained        
. . . .”55  This was an issue because, according to the Supreme Court, 
“[p]robable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the 
facts and circumstances within the affiant‟s knowledge, and of which 
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an of-
fense has been or is being committed.”56  Having reasonable grounds 
to believe that the issuance of this warrant may lead to evidence of a 
crime is clearly not the same as believing that a crime has taken place 
or will soon take place. 
Thus, New York‟s eavesdropping statute lacked the particu-
 
49 See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[S]urveillance that is 
properly authorized and carried out under Title III complies with the fourth amendment.”). 
50 Berger, 388 U.S. at 43. 
51 Id. at 54. 
52 Berger, 388 U.S. at 70 (Black, J., dissenting). 
53 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The Fourth Amendment‟s] pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magi-
strate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”). 
54 Berger, 388 U.S. at 54. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 55. 
7
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larity requirements the Fourth Amendment demands and as such it 
was ruled to be unconstitutional.57  In response to the Court‟s hold-
ing, Congress enacted Title III to address Berger‟s concerns regard-
ing the Fourth Amendment and to set forth the requirements for is-
suing an eavesdropping warrant.58  In addition, New York also 
responded to the decision by formulating a new eavesdropping statute 
that was heavily influenced by Title III.59  In many respects, New 
York‟s current eavesdropping statute, codified as CPL 700, contains 
provisions that are identical or substantially the same as its federal 
counterpart.60 
For example, in New York, the application to obtain an eave-
sdropping warrant cannot be granted without “a showing that normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or reasona-
bly appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous to 
employ.”61  In addition, the application for the warrant must contain 
“[a] full and complete statement of facts establishing” those show-
ings.62  Likewise, Title III requires an electronic surveillance warrant 
application to contain “a full statement as to whether or not other in-
vestigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger-
ous.”63  Federal law also requires the judge granting the warrant to 
determine that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous.”64 
 
57 Id. at 64. 
58 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 454 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
59 Serrano, 450 F. Supp.2d at 236 n.76 (“The federal and New York State statutory re-
quirements for obtaining an electronic eavesdropping warrant are basically the same and 
there is no discernible difference between federal and state case law regarding these re-
quirements.”).  In Rabb, Judge Pigott, writing for the majority, noted how it was the New 
York State Legislature‟s intention to “conform „State standards for court-authorized eave-
sdropping warrants with federal standards.‟ ”  Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450 (quoting People v. 
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. 1978)). 
60 Id. at 450 (noting that it was not merely coincidental that the provisions of Title III and 
CPL 700 are substantively identical because it was the New York Legislature‟s intent to con-
form New York eavesdropping standards to that of federal standards). 
61 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15. 
62 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20(2)(d). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2006). 
64 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).  It is a prerequisite under both New York and federal law to 
demonstrate that less intrusive investigation techniques had be tried or would be futile if at-
tempted.  See United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Both [New York and 
8
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In addition, neither New York law nor federal law requires 
law enforcement agents to exhaust all other possible avenues of sur-
veillance before resorting to electronic surveillance.65  So long as 
employing a wiretap is not a routine initial step or used when tradi-
tional investigative techniques would be sufficient, the use of a wire-
tap will be valid.66  All that is required for an electronic surveillance 
warrant is a demonstration that those traditional techniques would fail 
or be likely to fail.67 
IV. INSTANCES WHERE NEW YORK PROVIDES EQUAL OR MORE 
PROTECTION THAN TITLE III 
Despite the identical, or at the very least substantially similar 
language of CPL 700 to Title III, the New York Court of Appeals has 
interpreted some provisions of CPL 700 more narrowly than Title III.  
For example, in People v. Washington,68 law enforcement officers 
failed to seal the tape recording from electronic surveillance until 
thirty-nine days after the expiration of the warrant.69  CPL 700.50(2) 
requires the officers to present the recordings to a judge “immediately 
upon the expiration of the period of an eavesdropping or video sur-
 
federal law] require a showing that investigative procedures less intrusive than a wiretap 
have been tried or are unlikely to succeed if tried.”). 
65 See Sarrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (“ „Neither the New York nor the federal statute 
requires that any particular investigative procedures be exhausted before a wiretap may be 
authorized.‟ ” (quoting Lilla, 699 F.2d at 104)). 
66 See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (noting how the New York and fed-
eral statutes are “designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where 
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime”).  Because CPL § 700 
is substantively identical to Title III, the Court of Appeals in Rabb cited to federal law as 
persuasive authority to establish that law enforcement officials need not “exhaust all con-
ceivable investigative techniques before resorting to electronic surveillance.”  Rabb, 945 
N.E.2d at 452 (citing Concepcion, 579 F.3d at 218). 
67 See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974) (explaining that applicant for a 
wiretap “must state and the court must find that normal investigative procedures have been 
tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger-
ous” (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(c), (3)(c))); see also Lilla, 699 F.2d at 103 (stating that an 
affidavit “must provide some basis for concluding that less intrusive investigative procedures 
are not feasible”).  But see United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“Even if conventional techniques have been somewhat successful, however, a wiretap may 
still be authorized.” (citing United States v. O‟Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1415 (8th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988), and, 488 U.S. 1011 (1989))). 
68 385 N.E.2d 593 (N.Y. 1978). 
69 Id. at 594. 
9
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veillance warrant.”70  The court ruled that the tapes were due to the 
judge immediately upon the expiration of that particular warrant or 
extension, and not at the termination of the original order.71  On the 
contrary, in United States v. Fury,72 the Second Circuit held that the 
government only needed to seal the tapes once the extension of the 
original order was terminated.73 
In People v. Winograd,74 the police failed to seal and present 
the tapes to a different justice when the issuing justice was unavaila-
ble due to a religious holiday.75  The Court of Appeals held that the 
mistake by the police did not constitute a valid excuse and the tapes 
should have been suppressed.76  However, in United States v.      
Massino,77 an excuse was provided and accepted by the court for fail-
ing to immediately seal the tapes, allowing the tapes to be admissi-
ble.78  Furthermore, federal courts depart from the New York‟s de-
mand for immediacy, allowing for delays ranging from six to forty-
two days depending on the circumstances.79 
Perhaps one of the more significant departures of CPL 700 
from Title III was the New York Legislature‟s intent to use eave-
sdropping as a primary weapon against organized crime.80  The court 
 
70 Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.50(2). 
71 Washington, 385 N.E.2d at 598. 
72 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977). 
73 Id. at 533. 
74 502 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1986). 
75 Id. at 191. 
76 Id. at 195.  See also People v. Gallina, 485 N.E.2d 216, 220 (N.Y. 1985) (“Inadequate 
police procedures, apparently responsible for the delay, do not constitute a valid excuse.  Nor 
does the unavailability of the issuing justice constitute a valid excuse for the failure to timely 
seal the tapes produced by wiretap four in a county where several other justices are present 
each business day.” (citing Washington, 385 N.E.2d at 597-98)). 
77 784 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1986). 
78 Id. at 158.  See also Fury, 554 F.2d at 533 (holding that a six-day delay due to the un-
availability of the supervising judge was a reasonable excuse). 
79 See United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a “relatively 
short” delay of three to eight days is excusable where the tapes have to be shipped to their 
destination); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a sev-
en-day delay where there was a lack of bad faith or attempt to evade the statute‟s provisions 
was excusable); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a thir-
teen-day delay caused by confusion over which judge would seal the tapes did not require 
suppression); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that 
twenty-four and forty-two day delays do not warrant suppression when efforts were made to 
prepare the tapes for sealing and when the prosecutor heading the investigation was hospita-
lized). 
80 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451. 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 25
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/25
  
2012] FOURTH AMENDMENT 833 
in Rabb acknowledged how former Governor Rockefeller cham-
pioned the eavesdropping law for providing “greater flexibility in the 
employment of eavesdropping as an effective weapon against 
crime[,]” especially against organized crime where evidence is often 
difficult to collect for prosecution.81  The New York Legislature rec-
ognized the “tight structure of organized crime groups, their use of 
brutal force to discourage informants, and the high degree to which 
key members have insulated themselves from criminal liability.”82  
Therefore, traditional investigative and surveillance techniques most 
frequently result in the arrest and conviction of lower-echelon mem-
bers of organized crime groups and not the leaders.83  By contrast, no 
federal laws or cases emphasize the importance or use of eavesdrop-
ping as it relates to organized crime.84 
In other ways, however, the Court of Appeals has interpreted 
identical or substantially similar provisions in ways that demand no 
more than what the federal law requires.  Neither CPL 700 nor Title 
III requires that the eavesdropping warrant specifically state the tele-
phone number to be tapped.85  Instead, as long as the telephone line is 
specified in the application, the electronic surveillance will be 
upheld.86 
Additionally, Title III requires law enforcement officials to 
file progress reports if the issuing judge so demands,87 usually in or-
der to facilitate the judge‟s supervision of the wiretap.88  However, 





84 See id. at 455 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Title III contains “no special dis-
pensation for organized crime investigations”). 
85 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20. 
86 See People v. Darling, 742 N.E.2d 596, 600 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the telephone 
number does not need to be stated in the warrant and noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 also does 
not require a specific telephone number).  See also United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 
680 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that listing the specific telephone numbers is not required under 
the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment or Title III). 
87 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6). 
88 See Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 641 (stating that the progress reports are “designed to enable 
the district judge to evaluate the continuing need for surveillance”); People v. Marino, 403 
N.E.2d 179, 180 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that while CPL 700.50 does not mandate progress 
reports, a supervising judge may require them in order to be informed of the status of the in-
vestigation). 
89 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977). 
11
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motion to suppress the eavesdropping evidence despite the govern-
ment‟s failure to file the reports in a timely fashion.90  Similarly, in 
People v. Marino,91 the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the 
District Attorney to file progress reports as per CPL 700.50 did not 
warrant suppression of the eavesdropping tapes.92  As such, the lan-
guage of CPL 700.50 and its federal counterpart are substantively 
similar, and the sanctions imposed for violating those provisions are 
similar too. 
V. INSTANCES WHERE NEW YORK CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL 
INTERPRETATIONS BY OFFERING LESS PROTECTION THAN 
TITLE III 
It is clear that Title III heavily influenced the New York Leg-
islature when it drafted CPL 700.  As mentioned above, the New 
York law relating to exhausting investigative methods and employing 
methods that would be useless or ineffective was largely borrowed 
from federal law.93  However, there are also instances where New 
York did not borrow the interpretations of Title III and instead offers 
less protection. 
As pointed out by the dissent in Rabb, it is arguable that the 
People did not satisfy the requirements for an eavesdropping war-
rant.94  The warrant application against Rabb and P & D was granted 
after an investigation into Akbar and its principals, Walker and Ras-
berry.95  At the time, investigators believed that Rabb was somehow 
connected to the racketeering activities of Akbar, but the extent of 
these activities was unascertained.96  Moreover, the supporting affi-
davit accompanying the warrant application contained generalized 
statements about Rabb‟s activities, and most of the arguments in the 
affidavit were virtually identical to those arguments from the Akbar 
warrant application.97 
 
90 Id. at 641. 
91 403 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1980). 
92 Id. at 180. 
93 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450. 
94 Id. at 458-59 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 455. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 456-57.  The dissent noted that the allegations purporting to establish a need for a 
wiretap occupied less than four pages of the entire sixty-four page affidavit.  Rabb, 945 
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The most important aspect of the dissent‟s analysis is noting 
the lack of particulars in the warrant application which are required 
by the Fourth Amendment when granting an eavesdropping war-
rant.98  In the affidavit, the People only noted “a number” of tradi-
tional surveillance attempts at identifying Rabb or P & D before ap-
plying for an eavesdropping warrant, claiming that “normal 
investigative procedures [had] been tried and [had] failed.”99  Most of 
the supporting information in the affidavit was based solely on the 
investigation into Akbar and not into Rabb.100  It appeared as though 
the court granting the warrant relied on the results of normal inves-
tigative methods used against Akbar to determine that those same 
methods would be ineffective against Rabb.101 
By permitting a judge to issue a warrant against one organiza-
tion based on the successful – or unsuccessful – nature of investiga-
tive techniques employed against a separate, albeit related organiza-
tion, the court is circumventing constitutional protections.102  
Essentially, by reiterating the arguments made for the Akbar warrant, 
the People explained why the previous investigative methods failed 
for Akbar, not Rabb and P & D, therefore failing to satisfy CPL 
700.15(4) and 700.20(2)(d).103 
Several federal cases have addressed similar situations as this 
one, providing greater clarity and interpretation for New York‟s sta-
tutory counterpart.  For example, in United States v. Santora,104 an 
 
N.E.2d at 456-57 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting).  In addition, most of those arguments were 
“barely distinguishable” from the arguments set forth against Walker and Rasberry, drawing 
the inference that the government just substituted those names for Rabb and P & D.  Id. at 
456. 
98 Id. at 457. 
99 Id. at 456. 
100 Id. 
101 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 456 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting). 
102 This bears on the particularity requirements needed to issue a warrant.  The grounds 
for issuing the warrant must be specific to the person against whom the warrant is being is-
sued.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”).  Substituting the particulars from one investigation to 
another ignores the particularity requirements for the specific investigation.  United States v. 
Gonzalez, Inc., 412 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005). 
103 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d.at 457.  See also United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 826 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (“Less intrusive investigative procedures may 
succeed with one putative participant while they may not succeed with another.”). 
104 600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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initial eavesdropping warrant had been granted for an investigation 
into a conspiracy for selling airline tickets, but the court refused to 
grant subsequent eavesdropping warrants during the same investiga-
tion.105  The court determined that the applications for the subsequent 
warrants were not sufficiently made out and that the government 
could not “dispense with the required [particularity] showing when 
applying to tap the telephones of other conspirators.”106  Similarly, in 
United States v. Gonzalez, Inc.,107 the court found that previously is-
sued eavesdropping warrants did not provide a sufficient basis to 
demonstrate the necessity of further wiretaps.108 
This is the first instance where the Court of Appeals has di-
rectly departed from the federal approach concerning electronic eave-
sdropping.  In Rabb, the court issued an eavesdropping warrant 
against Rabb and P & D solely based on the People‟s prior expe-
rience with their investigation into Akbar.109  Although P & D and 
Akbar were similar organizations with similar objectives, there is lit-
tle to no evidence supporting a claim that both were engaged in a 
racketeering conspiracy or criminal enterprise.110 
The dissent explained how, even if there had been any sup-
porting evidence, “the showing of necessity made in justification of 
the Akbar wiretaps was not transferrable to support the P & D wire-
taps.”111  In essence, the majority dispensed with the necessity re-
quirement for Rabb and P & D to justify transferring the necessity 
found for employing wiretaps against Akbar to Rabb.112  This is in di-
rect conflict with federal case law where courts have expressly for-
bidden dispensing with the statutorily mandated showing of necessity 
 
105 Id. at 1321-22. 
106 Id. at 1321. 
107 412 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). 
108 Id. at 1115 (“[T]he government is not free to transfer a statutory showing of necessity 
from one application to another–even within the same investigation.  This court has held that 
an issuing judge may not examine various wiretap applications together when deciding 
whether a new application meets the statutory necessity requirement.  Each wiretap applica-
tion must separately satisfy the necessity requirement.”).  See United States v. Carneiro, 861 
F.2d 1171, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating subsequent applications for wiretaps de-
spite upholding the order granting the initial wiretap because the government failed to show 
that particularized investigative methods were employed against each suspect and were un-
successful or unlikely to be successful). 
109 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 452. 
110 Id. at 459 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
111 Id. (citing Santora, 600 F.2d at 1321-22; Gonzalez, 412 F.3d at 1115). 
112 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 459. 
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for a particular organization or person, regardless of their association 
with the initial suspect or organization for which the original warrant 
was issued.113 
Because New York statutory law and case law regarding ea-
vesdropping has a history of being influenced by Title III and other 
federal cases, the dissent felt the court should have adopted this inter-
pretation of CPL 700.  Under this interpretation, the affidavit would 
have been inadequate to support the issuance of the warrant, leading 
to the suppression of the tapes against Rabb and Mason.114  It is un-
clear whether the Court of Appeals knowingly departed from the fed-
eral approach or did so indirectly.  However, the fact remains that this 
was the initial step to taking New York law on eavesdropping in a di-
rection away from established federal case law.  Given the history of 
New York mirroring its interpretations of its own laws on eavesdrop-
ping on the federal approach, though, it is unlikely that this decision 









113 See Santora, 600 F.2d at 1321-22; Gonzalez, 412 F.3d at 1115. 
114 Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 460 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting).  See id. at 458 (“There, of course, 
was no remotely comparable history to recount with respect to the newly commenced inves-
tigation of „Divine‟ and P & D, and in its absence the affidavit's pat recitation of difficulties 
endemic to organized crime probes was patently insufficient to explain why ordinary inves-
tigative means would likely be fruitless with respect to „Divine‟ and P & D.”). 
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